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Representation and Intention:
Wittgenstein on What Makes a
Picture of a Target
Mark E. Weber
Sacred Heart University
and
University of Connecticut
Throughout his later philosophy, Wittgenstein repeatedly
asks the following: ”What makes my image of him into a n image of him?” (LW1 308).’ “What makes t h i s picture his picture?” (LW1 309). He t a k e s this same question to apply to
linguistic utterances: “Isn’t my question like this: ‘What makes
this sentence a sentence that has to do with him?’” (LW1 308).
This is by no means a peripheral concern of Wittgenstein’s,
a n d i n Philosophical Grammar (62), where h e first phrases
this question, he pronounces: “That’s him (this picture represents h i m b t h a t contains the whole problem of representation.”
This essay will explore Wittgenstein’s evolving interest i n
this key problem of representation, his criticisms of certain
tempting answers, and his own perspicuous solution.2 So as to
bring some cohesion to this highly ramified issue, I will mostly
restrict my discussion to mental images along with diagrams,
maps, models, sketches, paintings, a n d so on, which I will
lump together as “ p i c t ~ r e s . ”Loosely,
~
what sets apart pictures,
when they are used to depict how something is, is t h a t they
are correct when they resemble (look like, are projectable onto)
what they are meant to r e p r e ~ e n t The
. ~ later Wittgenstein assumes t h a t a picture may be of a n actual or possible, real or
fictitious, particular or type of thing or situation: for example,
Napoleon, Napoleon’s coronation, a kind of action, or people in
a village inn (cf., PG 114). In order to resolve a n ambiguity in
talk of what a picture “represents” or is “about” or “of,” I will
Since receiving his Ph.D. from Boston University in 1992, Mark Weber has been teaching philosophy as an Adjunct Assistant Professor at
various colleges in Connecticut. He has published a n article on
Wittgenstein, and he is also pursuing research in the philosophy of psychology.
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call the “target” what it is supposed t o be of, the “content” how
i t represents this target a s being (when it is used t o depict
how something is), and I will speak of what it resembles as a
structured complex a s what it “ s ~ o w s .Thus
” ~ a map, whose
target is t h e street plan of Manhattan, may show a grid of
streets, and in part have the content of representing that Fifth
Avenue runs along Central Park’s e a s t side. Provided this
rough distinction, I will clarify Wittgenstein’s question in this
direction: What makes a picture of a target?

I.
I will suggest t h a t Wittgenstein’s Tractatus was barred
from asking, in particular, what makes a picture of him or
represent that he is short or bald. This work was nonetheless
deeply concerned t o express both what comprises and what
grounds a picture’s target and content, and in such a way as
t o lay bare how a picture correctly or incorrectly represents
how things stand. These same concerns carry over into his
later thought even if, a s I will soon examine, his accounts of
each alter.
“We picture facts t o ourselves” ( 2 . 1 ) , according t o t h e
Tractatus, and a fact “is the existence of states of affairs” (2).
This is possible because a picture is a model of reality (2.12): it
“presents a situation in logical space, the existence and nonexistence of s t a t e s of affairs” (2.11). This means, t o speak
loosely for now, that a picture has “reality” as its target. “It is
laid against reality like a measure” (2.1512), so t h a t the picture is “true” o r “false” on the basis of whether i t agrees o r
disagrees with reality (2.21-2.225). This also means that a pict u r e must have a “sense,”roughly what I term a “content,”
which comprises how things are depicted as standing in reality (2.221). Now a picture cannot function t o model anything
unless it can be either true or false, and it cannot be either
unless it h a s a sense “independently of its t r u t h or falsity”
(2.22). Because its target is reality, a picture must therefore
have a sense apart from how things do stand in reality (cf.,
2.173). Yet, one cannot judge whether a picture is true or false
by comparing it with reality unless its sense at once reveals
which conditions make it true or false. Thus, a picture’s sense
is “a possible situation in logical space” (2.2221, and because
the picture represents t h a t this possible situation exists o r
does not exist, its sense is therefore how things stand in reality if it is true (cf., 4.022).
So what makes a picture have a particular sense? The answer is t h a t a picture’s sense is something it internally
“shows.” “A picture contains t h e possibility of t h e situation
that it represents” (2.2031, so that one sees this possible situation in the picture itself (cf., 4.023). For the situation t h a t is

290

Representation and Intention
the case if the picture is true consists in a determinate set of
simple objects of reality (2.01),whose definite relations to each
other are its “structure” (2.032),and where the “possibility of
t h i s s t r u c t u r e ” is its Kform”(2.033).Likewise, as a “fact”
(2.141),a picture is also a structure of elements (2.14,2.151,
where “the possibility of this structure” constitutes its “pictorial form” (2.15).Now, individually or as a heap, a picture’s elements have no sense but merely stand in for objects as their
“representatives” (2.13-2.131).I t is nonetheless the “pictorial
relationship” the picture “includes,” wherein the (simple) elements of t h e picture correlate to simple objects of reality
(2.1514),that enables the picture to contain the possibility of a
fixed set of simple objects against whose actual structure the
picture is measured. Unfortunately, the lZactatus does not say
how the two are correlated. Is it that an element is arbitrarily
assigned to an object to which one attends? Or is it that a n element correlates to just the object whose combinatorial possibilities in situations (the object’s “form,” 2.0141)mirrors its
combinatorial possibilities in pictures (the element’s “form?”)?
Though I will not make too much of it, I lean toward the second interpretation since it strikes me that a picture could not
show its sense unless (from within a system of pictures) i t
could show which things it depicts as standing a certain way.6
In any event, what enables the picture to contain the possibility of a precise structure of t h e objects correlating to its elements, apart from their actual structure, is its pictorial form.
For besides being t h e possibility of t h e picture’s structure,
“[plictorial form is the possibility t h a t things a r e related to
one another i n t h e same way as the elements of the picture”
(2.151).A picture’s sense is therefore determined by to which
possible structure of simple objects the picture is isomorphic
when its elements are correlated to these objects.
To speak more precisely now, on the Tractatus, a picture’s
target is how the simple objects of reality corresponding to its
elements are in fact arranged, while its content is how these
objects are arranged i f the picture is true. Thus, for example,
a picture is never of a particular chair and never represents
t h a t it is black or leather. For one thing, whatever t h e
Tractatus’ “simple objects” are, a particular chair is presumably entirely a structure of simple objects. For another, a
picture’s target is the actual arrangement, not of this chair’s
simples, but of the simple objects of reality correlating to the
picture’s elements. I t is t h i s t h a t t h e picture is measured
against, and because it is correct if and only if its structure is
of identical form to the actual structure of these objects, its
t r u t h or falsity is indifferent to whether these simple objects
compose an actual chair, or one arranged in a particular way.
Why does Wittgenstein later suppose that a picture’s target
may comprise him, where its content comprises how i t repre-
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sents that he is? This change in perspective grew out of a n increasing dissatisfaction with t h e Tractatus’ vision of t h e
ground of a picture’s target and content, to which I will now
turn.
11.

Starting with unease over the Pactatus’ idea that the truth
of one elementary proposition cannot depend on the t r u t h of
another (5.1341, prompted by the realization, for example, that
the t r u t h of ‘x is red’ excludes the t r u t h of ‘x is green,’ by the
mid-thirties Wittgenstein had given up several key doctrines
of t h e Tractatus infusing a n d supporting its vision of what
comprises and grounds a picture’s content and target. On the
one hand, he abandoned its “metaphysical atomism.” Things
are simple or complex, he eventually holds, not absolutely but
only relative to practices wherein we divide things into their
elements (PI 47).7Consider a schematic drawing of a cube, A,
and a wooden cube, B. One might construe B’s simples as six
flat surfaces or twelve edges, as eight one-square-foot cubes or
two four-square-foot volumes, or as its molecules or atoms.
But if B’s structure is a function of both its elements and their
arrangement, then B will consist in different structures on different “methods of analysis” (my term). The same goes for A.
On the other hand, Wittgenstein gave up the idea t h a t anything has a n “absolute form.” In the Tractatus, the “identical
form” of A and B was thought to “enable” the projection of A
onto B (TLP 2.16-2.17), so that A is projectable onto B because
they s h a r e t h e s a m e form. By his Philosophical Grammar
(113) Wittgenstein had reversed the order of explanation: A
and B may be said to share the same form just because A is
projectable onto B. With what A shares the same form depends
on how one projects from A, and different “methods of projection” a r e possible. By utilizing different methods one could
project A, as a structure of lines, now onto a cube, now onto a
two-dimensional photograph of a cube, and now onto a pyramid (cf., PG pp. 212-4; PI 139).
Now this does not mean t h a t Wittgenstein drops as incoherent talk of what a picture “shows.” The above implies just
t h a t the complexes A a n d B a r e or a r e not isomorphic only
given methods of analysis a n d projection, a n d t h a t neither
complex determines which methods ought to be used. Still, he
also comes to argue t h a t neither can another representation
determine how one ought to project from or analyze a complex
(PI 139-141, 198, 201). Certainly, for example, one may produce a schema C representing a method of projectingA onto B,
say by means of drawing A and B together with lines of projection running between their elements. But C cannot determine
how one ought to project A onto B, for different analyses and
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projections of C are possible, and C itself cannot show how C
ought to be analyzed or projected. The same holds true for any
other schema meant to show how C ought to be interpreted
and applied. Yet, it does not follow that there is no truth about
whether A is isomorphic to B. We may indeed speak of a “rule”
of correct projection. Wittgenstein’s point is t h a t this rule’s
representation does not fix but expresses what constitutes a
correct projection of A onto B. The criterion for whether one
correctly interprets and applies the represented rule is simply
whether one projects A onto B conformably to a particular custom or regular use. And we can proceed to correctly project A
onto B and thereby judge t h a t they a r e isomorphic, without
need of interpreting any represented rule, insofar as we have
been trained by example into techniques of going on with pictures (RPP2 400-16). These techniques are the outgrowth of
our physiology and environment, of our primitive behaviors
and needs, and of our more evolved social customs and institutions. In brief, it is these practices that allow for agreement on
the criteria for whether A really resembles B independent of
what someone at some point might think (cf., PI 241h8
All t h i s does imply, however, t h a t Wittgenstein could no
longer affirm the IFactatus’ doctrine of pictorial form wherein
a picture is held to contain the possibility of one determinate
structure of simple objects by virtue of being one determinate
structure of pictorial elements. For not only is it possible to
analyze a picture into different structures of elements, even
given j u s t one such analysis it is also possible to project i t
onto different types of articulated complexes. All this implies
as well that Wittgenstein had to give up the doctrine of pictorial relationship whereby a picture contains the possibility of
a n exact set of simple objects by virtue of consisting in a n exact set of pictorial elements. For he could no longer suppose
t h a t pictures and the possible situations they picture decompose into absolute simples and simples of determinate combinatorial possibilities. But if no picture by itself contains the
possibility of e i t h e r a n unique s e t of simple objects or a n
uniquely determinate way in which they are structured, then
in itself no picture can show j u s t this and not that “possible
situation in logical space.-

How, then, may a picture have a content? What a picture
shows as a n arrangement of elements remains p a r t of t h e
equation for the later Wittgenstein (cf., PG 121; PI 523). Of
course, a picture can show something only relative to methods
of analysis and projection (cf., PG pp. 212-4), and only by virtue of a viewer’s “recognizing in it objects in some sort of characteristic arrangement” (PG 115, cf., PG 37; PI 526). In the
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last regard, while it may be capable of showing something that
a viewer may fail to recognize, what a picture does show depends on the viewer’s conceptual repertoire (LW1 734). In order to see a duck in a figure one needs to know what a duck is
and what it looks like (RPP1 872); and in order to see a running horse in a painting one needs to know that horses do not
just stand in that position (RPP1 873).
Still, a picture’s content cannot be strictly a function of
what it shows. We have seen t h a t a picture can show far too
many things. In addition, a picture’s showing a possible complex (say, a brick house) is not the same as its representing a
fact (say, t h a t a certain house is brick) (cf., P G 114).
Wittgenstein cautions against thinking that a picture can represent a fact only when it is translated into words or other pictures (PG 37, 114, 123). Yet, he also denies t h a t a picture can
represent a fact simply by virtue of showing something (PG
pp. 199-201). One house may after all resemble another, but
t h a t does not make it a representation of the fact t h a t t h e
other is a house or is a house of a certain design.1°
On Wittgenstein’s view, i t is how one uses a picture, t h e
type of action one performs with it, that makes it represent a
fact. I t need not be so used, and he now emphasizes the diverse ways a picture may function: as a portrait, historical
painting, genre-painting, landscape, map, diagram, or blueprint (cf., PG 114). Further, he now stresses that the same pict u r e could have now t h i s use, now t h a t , so t h a t it is only a
picture-token that represents a fact: “Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a particular stance. Now, this picture can be
used to tell someone how he should stand, should hold himself;
or how he should not hold himself; or how a particular man
did stand in such-and-such a place; and so on” (PI p. 11, bottom).
In turn, Wittgenstein comes to see that it is the target that
allows a picture-token to have a discriminate content despite
the promiscuity of what it shows as a type of structured complex. As he now views things, the target is a function, not of to
which simple objects the elements of a picture-type correlate,
but of that to which a picture-token is applied, on a variety of
its uses. I shall later explore Wittgenstein’s conception of this
“application” and why he ties it to someone’s intention. Here I
need stress t h a t it enables him to realize t h a t a picture-type
does not need to possess a content. Rather, only a picturetoken h a s a content, which i t h a s in virtue of both what it
shows a n d to which target it is applied, so t h a t its content
comprises how this target is if the picture is accurate. Depending on to which target it is applied, therefore, the same roundshaped figure may represent now the fact that a certain coin’s
face is circular in shape, or now the fact t h a t someone’s head
is spherical rather than ovoid. This at once provides a basis on
294
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which to discriminate what a picture-token is supposed to
show from all t h a t a picture-type can show. The fact t h a t a
picture is a map, and one of New York City’s streets, for example, constrains, from within practices of map-reading, how
one ought to interpret its lines a n d colors and project from
them.”
All this often surfaces in Wittgenstein’s comparison of pictures to yardsticks. In his transitional Philosophical Remarks
he writes: “You cannot compare a picture with reality, unless
you can set it against it as a yardstick” (43).“It only makes
sense to give t h e length of a n object if I have a method for
finding the object-since otherwise I cannot apply a yardstick
to it” (36).Notice that it makes no sense to say that of itself a
yardstick shows w h a t is t h e case i n reality if it is t r u e .
Within a practice of its use, a yardstick constitutes a “method
of measurement” (PG 84).Yet, it cannot provide a n actual
measurement of length unless it is used to measure something
and is laid against a particular object. I t is this actual measurement (the representation of a fact), not the yardstick itself
(as a complex), t h a t is accurate depending on whether it
agrees with the object’s length (cf., PG 85). This analogy, then,
suggests that it is equally senseless to say that a picture by itself shows what is the case in reality if it is true. The picture
provides a “method of measurement” by virtue of w h a t it
shows; and Wittgenstein compares a picture, taken apart from
any particular use or any particular application to a target, to
a “proposition-radical” (PI p. 11 bottom). But it may produce
a n “actual measurement” only insofar as it is applied of a particular target. And it is accurate depending on whether what it
represents this target as being agrees with what this target is.

This way of thinking of pictorial representation may be further elucidated by briefly considering how Wittgenstein later
conceives of t h e logic of linguistic representation. For there
turn out to be striking parallels between the two, even though
he has abandoned the idea that a proposition is a kind of picture whose sense is grounded in the manner the Ductatus had
envisaged for pictures.
Intertwined with Wittgenstein’s discussion of what makes a
picture of a target is the question of what makes a sentencetoken of a target such as him (e.g., LW1 308-18; PI 660-693).
But this ought not be confused with the question of what connects a sign-type to a “bearer” or “reference.” Nor should the
question of what makes a particular utterance of “he is coming” a n assertion, or the expression of a n expectation or wish,
whose content is that the particular person N is coming (cf., PI
441-4), be mistaken for the question of how this proposition-
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type has a sense. To explain, say, of which person someone is
speaking, or t o explain what it is that someone is asserting, is
to describe the application of language, and Wittgenstein is
careful to mark this off from the explanation of the meaning of
our words.
According to Philosophical Grammar (45)’ the meaning of a
sign is part of the “grammar of language.” Only here does a
word function as a certain sort of tool. When a word is used as
a “name,” t h e grammar sets out where in the language this
sign “is stationed”-establishing, for example, what sort of
thing gets christened by a name through an ostensive definition (PG 45)-and the link of name t o bearer belongs to t h e
grammar (PG 55-6). Thus only in the grammar does a proposition have a sense: “That an empirical proposition is true and
another false is not part of the grammar. What belongs to the
grammar a r e all t h e conditions (the method) necessary for
comparing the proposition with reality. That is, all the conditions necessary for understanding (of the sense)” (PG 45). But,
importantly, none of this is to speak of the “application” of language (PG 451, and a location in a system of grammar does not
lend a word or proposition a n application but makes it a particular “method of measurement.” As Wittgenstein writes: “The
role of a sentence in t h e calculus is i t s sense. A method of
measurement-of length, for example-has exactly the same
relation t o t h e correctness of a statement of length as t h e
sense of a sentence h a s t o its t r u t h or falsehood“ (PG 84).
Thus, the explanation of the meaning of a sign through a verbal or ostensive definition “remains a t the level of generality
preparatory t o any application” (PG 45).
During t h e thirties, Wittgenstein increasingly refers to
“language-games” in place of “grammar.” I share t h e belief
t h a t this flags a shift from seeing a sign’s use or meaning a s
fixed by its place in an all-purpose, rule-based, calculus t o seeing it a s tied t o particular actions themselves inhering in
certain human and social practices. As a consequence,
Wittgenstein no longer t h i n k s t h e explanation of a sign’s
meaning can prepare one to apply it in any context or as part
of any action. Yet, “language-games” play a similar role to “the
grammar”: they make a sign a type of tool, or give it a type of
meaning, but do not lend it an application (cf., RPPl 240; PI
241). To explain the meaning of signs is still to “describe methods of measurement” rather than t o “obtain and state results
of measurement”-even if, as he now stresses, “what we call
‘measuring’ is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement” (PI 242).
Now, if t h e use or meaning of types of signs in our language-games constitute types of methods of measurement,
then, from this later perspective of Wittgenstein’s, particular
results of measurement cannot be obtained and stated unless
296
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these signs a r e applied to particular objects at certain times
and in certain contexts-and if they a r e applied to other objects, different results will ensue. And to describe which object
is measured in some time and context, or which result of measurement is obtained and stated, is to explain, respectively,
what comprises the target and content of a particular application of a sentence.
Provided this schema, let u s focus on what makes a particular utterance of a sentence of a target. A sentence often
contains a subject expression, whether a demonstrative,
proper name, plural noun, definite or indefinite description,
which “designates,” let us say, the object to which its predicate
expressions are applied. As Wittgenstein remarks:
If I point to a circle and say ‘That is a circle’ then someone can object that if it were not a circle it would no longer be that. That is
to say, what I mean by the word ‘that’ must be independent of
what I assert about it. (PG p. 206)

It is Wittgenstein’s view t h a t the object designated by such a
subject expression is t h e one t h e speaker intends or means
(meinen), and t h a t it is the application the speaker makes of
this expression, and not only the grammar of language, t h a t
establishes a connection to t h i s object (cf., PG 62; Z 24; PI
686-9). This does not mean t h a t the object designated is not
often the object t h a t is t h e bearer of a sign. Nor, as we will
see, does this mean t h a t a speaker could designate a n object
without participating i n diverse language-games. What i t
means is t h a t the target of the sentence “he is coming,” t h e
person designated by “he,” hinges on who u t t e r s it. For, as
Wittgenstein observes, unlike the explanation of a sign-type’s
sense or reference, t h e explanation of which object someone
means to be speaking of makes appeal to the speaker’s circumstances, together with what this person believes, thinks and
does (RPPZ 254; cf., Z 9). He notes that certain words may be
about him because they are used to express the thought of him
(PG 62): it is their belonging to a language plus this context
t h a t makes them of him (LW1 113; PI p. 217; R P P l 230). Or,
as he remarks while discussing that a conversation is of him:
“In saying this you refer to the time of speaking. It makes a
difference whether you refer to this time or t h a t (The explanation of a word does not refer to a point of time.)” (LW1 111;
cf., PI p. 217).12
This is fairly obvious in t h e case of demonstratives. The
later Wittgenstein denies that demonstratives are “names” or
“proper names” (PI 38-9).0ne upshot of this is that a demonstrative should not be viewed as having a bearer i n the language. It is best to see a demonstrative as a multiple-use tool,
one of whose uses in sentences i s to designate t h e subject.
297
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Here, which object is designated depends not simply on t h e
character of the demonstrative but also on the time and context
of its utterance.
B u t w h a t about subject expressions containing proper
names? Wittgenstein offers t h a t the link of the thought t h a t
Napoleon was crowned in the year 1805 to Napoleon is due to
two factors: “that the word ‘Napoleon’ occurs in the expression
of my thought, plus t h e connection t h a t word h a d with i t s
bearer” (PG 62). He adds that the latter connection need not be
established at the time one expresses this thought and t h a t it
may result from the fact t h a t “that was the way he signed his
name, that was how he was spoken to and so on” (PG 62).Still,
the link of the thought’s expression to Napoleon is not the same
as this link of name to bearer; for this same name may after all
have different bearers in the language, and thus the language
itself cannot fix which is m e a n t (cf., Z 7; PI 689). Nor is a
sentence’s target necessarily t h e bearer of any of its proper
names. When one is asked “Who was married to Marie
Antoinette?” and one wrongly answers, ”Napoleon,” the target
of the answer is Louis XVI, not Napoleon.
One may, of course, provide a definite description in clarifying whom one meant to designate with a proper name (PG 62;
BB p. 39). Or, as Wittgenstein observes, one may define
“Moses” via various definite descriptions, so t h a t a proposition
containing “Moses” will have different “senses” depending on
which description is assumed (PI 79). But one need not give up
one’s proposition as false if one learns that Moses does not satisfy a n assumed description; for one may be prepared to fall
back on other descriptions, or, if they prove false, on yet others
still. Of course, one could use a proper name as if it were a
definite description and use it to designate whatever satisfies
the description (cf., PI 87). Given this use, the language may
settle what one designates. But when one uses a proper name
to designate the object of which one believes some of a loose set
of definite descriptions to hold true, which object one means
also hinges on w h a t one believes of t h i s object. And if one
falsely believes that a regular at the local golf course is the expresident Gerald Ford, whom one designates by “the ex-president Gerald Ford” i n the sentence “The ex-president Gerald
Ford has on new loafers” might not be the person who satisfies
this description.

V.
Commenting on its view that we “picture facts to ourselves”
(TLP 2.1)and that pictures model reality by virtue of pictorial
form and pictorial relationship, the Tractatus states: “That is
how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right up to it”
(TLP 2.1511).If Wittgenstein later rejects this vision of how
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representations connect to reality, he by no means loses interest in how they do so. His interlocutor phrases the issue this
way: “Put a ruler against a body; it does not say that the body
is such-and-such a length. Rather is it in itself-I should like
to say-dead, and achieves nothing of what thought achieves”
(PI 430). Wittgenstein wants to dispel this idea t h a t it takes
“thought” as a peculiar medium to enliven our “dead” pictures
or sentences and tie them to reality. Life is not breathed into
them, rather they are alive in their use-their use is their life
(PI 432). And our pictures and sentences “reach right up to reality” when they are used, not only to describe reality, but also
to give an order or to express a wish or expectation.
For Wittgenstein, as we have seen, our pictures and sentences may meet up with reality in such actions because within
our pictorial and linguistic practices they constitute methods of
measurement. It is due to the meaning of “he” and “is coming”
in the language that “He is coming” expresses a particular expectation, so t h a t “[ilt is i n language t h a t a n expectation and
its fulfillment make contact” (PI 445; cf., PI 429, 443-4; PG 556). Even so, our pictures and sentences cannot meet up with reality i n these diverse actions unless they a r e also applied of
targets. Only then does the utterance of “he is coming,” or the
creation or use of a portrait, as a particular act performed i n
the context of certain thoughts and actions and circumstances,
make contact with a particular person and have a certain content (cf., PI 454-457; PG 62).
If this is so, then a perspicuous overview is needed of what
makes a representation of a target, and “the whole problem of
representation” therefore pivots on this question. I have said
that, for Wittgenstein, of which target a sentence is applied depends on what i t s speaker means (meinen) or intends. The
same, he asserts, holds true of pictures. “The expression of intention describes the model to be copied; describing the copy
does not” (PG 58). “An obvious, and correct, answer to the question ‘What makes a portrait the portrait of so-and-so?’ is that it
is the intention” (BB p. 32). Likewise: “Image and intention.
Forming a n image can also be compared to creating a picture in
this way-namely, I am not imagining whoever is like my image: no, I a m imagining whoever i t is I mean to imagine”
(RPP2 115).
Let us again restrict our focus to pictures. I have gestured
at the bond a representation’s application has to someone’s intention. Beyond this, why does Wittgenstein conclude that “the
intention” is the “obvious, and correct, answer” to his question?
To paraphrase PR 20, it is because he believes t h a t to exclude
the intention gets wrong the function of pictures and destroys
the whole logic of pictorial representation. Before turning to his
conception of the intention, let u s first see why he thinks this
is so.
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VI.
“What makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N.? The answer
which might first suggest itself is: The similarity between the
portrait and Mr. N” (BB p. 32).I shall label the “Resemblance
Thesis” this long-standing notion that a picture’s target is simply whatever it best resembles. Clearly, Wittgenstein never affirmed t h i s thesis. Yet, h e raises a n d rejects it i n several
places (e.g., BB p. 32; PG 62;LW1 318;PI p. 177). He faults
this thesis, not because he finds talk of resemblance incoherent, but because it makes a mess of the logic of pictorial representation-something h e was a t pains to clarify i n t h e
fiactatus.
Wittgenstein has found that a picture-token has a discriminate content only i n relation to a discriminate target. However, the Resemblance Thesis entails that a picture cannot be
of just Napoleon, or just the Louvre, unless it resembles this
person or building better t h a n anything else; a n d we have
seen t h a t what a picture may resemble is far too promiscuous
to afford any such “unique fit.” But perhaps, as Wittgenstein’s
interlocutor asserts, this does not hold true for peculiarly mental images:
‘The image must be more like the object than any picture. For,
however like I make the picture to what it is supposed to represent, it can always be the picture of something else a s well.
But it is essential to the image that it is the image of this and
nothing else.’ Thus one might come to regard the image a s a
super-likeness. (PI 389)

Wittgenstein affirms that one may indeed imagine just King’s
College on fire, and no other building (BB p. 39). But he denies t h a t this is so because one’s image manages to uniquely
resemble King’s College. As Wittgenstein’s interlocutor asks:
“How do you know that it’s King’s College you imagine on fire?
Couldn’t i t be a different building, very much like it? In fact,
is your imagination so absolutely exact t h a t there might not
be a dozen buildings whose representation your image could
be?” (BB p. 39).
“Going by t h e usual criteria of knowledge,” Wittgenstein
grants t h a t one may indeed know what one imagines (cf., Z
22). One can say, and one has no doubts (Z 7). Here, t h a t is,
“‘know’ means that the expression of uncertainty is senseless”
(PI247). But because it entails t h a t one would have to Zearn
t h a t one imagines him by means of recognizing him in one’s
image, the Resemblance Thesis cannot account for this certainty. Wittgenstein remarks: “Of course I was thinking of
him: I saw him in my mind’s eye!-But I did not recognize him
by his appearance” (Z 31;RPPl 229).For, first, if one were to
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come to a judgment about what one imagines on the basis of
what one recognizes in one’s image, the promiscuity of resemblance would render one’s judgment uncertain. Besides, one
can imagine someone one has never seen (RPP1 231). Second,
the Resemblance Thesis errs more fundamentally in assuming
t h a t one is i n t h e position of having to ascertain what one
imagines (LW1 811, 831-5). Even when a n image “just pops
into one’s head,” one is only under a psychological, not logical,
“compulsion” to treat it as a n image of t h a t which one recognizes i n it (cf., LW1 316; PI 139-140, p. 177). And when, i n
contrast, one imagines him i n t h e course of thinking about
him, one “knows” whom one imagines, not because one h a s
reasons for being certain (PI 679), but because one does not
tell this from anything at all.
Finally, Wittgenstein claims t h a t “it is the essence” of the
idea of a portrait “that it should make sense to talk of a good
or bad portrait. In other words it is essential t h a t [it] should
be capable of representing things as they are in fact not” (BB
p. 32). In this respect, he asks whether one could not discover
t h a t one imagined someone quite wrongly (LW1 308), and he
comments t h a t “I have a n image of N.N. even if my image is
wrong” (RPP2 82). But the Resemblance Thesis cannot allow
for either accurate or inaccurate pictorial representation (BB
p. 32). For a picture P could not rightly or wrongly represent a
target T unless there could be a difference between what T is
like and what P represents T as being like; and since the latt e r depends on w h a t P shows, P’s accuracy depends on
whether P appropriately resembles T.However, if P were not
to resemble T,or were to better resemble something else, then,
according to the Resemblance Thesis, T could not be P‘s target.

VII.
At this point, it may be tempting to call upon causation to
fix the target, freeing up resemblance to account for what a
picture shows along with its accuracy. But how exactly might
causation do the job? Well, i t appears t h a t a picture’s target
may often comprise a particular such as Napoleon o r
Napoleon’s coronation. It also appears that different tokens of
the same picture, as a type of structured complex, may have
different targets. Thus, rather than appeal to with which property instantiations tokens of a picture-type causally covary, it
may be better to suppose that the target of a picture-token is
just the particular object that factors into its causal genesis in
some particular way. Let u s call this the “Causal Thesis.”13
While Wittgenstein has little patience with causal theories
of meaning or intentionality in general, in such places as BB
pp. 32-3 and PG 57-61 he raises several issues t h a t bear on
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this Causal Thesis. Now, if one copies a picture from a certain
object, one’s picture may be causally linked to this object in
various ways. But, as Wittgenstein notes, even if one tries to
copy a picture from one object one may do so in order to depict
another. This suggests that, even when a picture’s target is the
object copied, it is nonetheless the picture’s application and not
its causal link t o an object that makes it of this object.
Indeed, a key challenge for t h e Causal Thesis lies i n explaining how one thing’s being caused by another in a certain
situation makes the other its target. What carries the explanatory weight h e r e is not t h e idea that smoke “indicates” or
“means” fire but the idea that the picture’s formation belongs to
a “process” of copying-where it is natural to think that a particular copy is of the particular original from which it is derived via some process. In that case, what makes something a n
instance of copying?
What we call “copying something,” Wittgenstein observes
(BB p. 321, is not a type of physical or mental “process.” Now he
warns against thinking t h a t “the essence of copying is the intention to copy” if this means that the intention is a something
accompanying particular acts of copying. Yet, he comments that
“there a r e a great many different processes we call ‘copying
something’,” and he contends that what makes a particular process P the act of copying is not its similarity to other processes.
Nor is P t h i s act simply because P is causally linked to a
viewed object and issues in the production of some structured
complex: just because one makes a dark line on paper when one
sees a black dog, it does not follow that one is copying the black
dog. Rather, just as a particular process is that of putting one’s
opponent in check only when it belongs to a series of moves in a
particular game of chess together with all the rules of the game
(PI 197, 205), so P is a n act of copying only if P belongs to a series of acts together with a practice of copying (cf., PI 268).
Thus, if something functions as a copy insofar as it issues from
a n act of copying, i t does not have this function just because it
is causally linked to a n object in some fashion.
Granted this, i t still might be claimed t h a t a copy’s target
just is the object to which the copy is causally linked i n some
particular way. As Wittgenstein phrases this view, “that a picture is a portrait of a particular object consists in its being derived from that object in a particular way” (BB p. 33). However,
the derivation of a copy from a n object is again a n intentional
act, one that one may try to perform and not succeed at (PG 57;
BB p. 33), and not any particular kind of process or causal link
to a n object. We may think of this derivation as a kind of projection from object to copy, Wittgenstein remarks. But t h e n
someone may derive a copy from a n object only insofar as she
conforms to t h e method of projection, the rule. She could employ different methods of projection, moreover, and which is the
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one she employs does not consist i n what goes on when she
makes a copy. Indeed, on different interpretations she could be
construed as projecting her picture from different objects (PG
57).
While other avenues could be explored, it does not appear
that the Causal Thesis can explain what makes a copy or picture of just this or that target, let alone explain what makes
something function as a copy of anything. Nor can it do justice
to what a picture’s target may comprise. For not only may one
use a picture copied from one object to represent another, one
may after all make a picture of a possible or fictitious person,
thing, situation, or event to which no causal links are available. Finally, as Wittgenstein stresses from the Philosophical
Remarks (20-26) onward, since it entails that one must learn
what one copies by discovering to which object one’s copy i s
causally linked, a Causal Thesis can allow for neither one’s
knowing in advance what one means to copy nor one’s being
certain about what one copies.

VIII.
Let us ignore, for now, a prior intention to make a picture
of something, as well as what someone other than a picture’s
creator means it to be of, and let u s suppose t h a t someone,
Jill, intends a picture she paints to portray Jack. I shall refer
to this as “Jill’s intention.” If, as Wittgenstein claims, Jill’s
picture is of just the target she intends, then what is Jill’s intention if it resides neither in what her picture resembles nor
in its causal links to a n object? And how can it make her picture of Jack?
When one describes Jill’s intention one is not describing
what she does as so many physiological goings-on or saying
that the latter count as certain physical acts (such as painting
a picture) because they occur in certain circumstances or because they have a certain significance in our practices. Nor is
one describing all this together with the effects caused by Jill’s
physical acts: the fact t h a t Jill’s painting is of Jack is not a
physical s t a t e of h e r painting, nor is it a “physical event”
brought about by her bodily movements. It is tempting, then,
to think t h a t one is describing something which causes h e r
physical acts. Moreover it is natural to think of Jill’s behavior
and her painting as inheriting their “life,” their “aboutness,”
from her intention. It may thus be concluded that Jill’s intention must be some sort of mental process t h a t is itself about
J a c k (cf., BB pp. 4-5; 32). And because J i l l may a f t e r a l l
imagine, portray, speak of, or think of Jack, it may be supposed t h a t what “aims” each of these acts at Jack is just that
each is caused by a token of the same mental process, a n original and brute germ of “indicating him” (cf., 2 12; PI 689-93).
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Wittgenstein believes that to view any mental s t a t e as a
process is not innocuous but “commits u s to a particular way
of looking at the matter” (PI 3081, and he repeatedly claims
t h a t a n intention is not a process t h a t accompanies words or
pictures (LW1 820; PI p. 218). As he puts it: “If God looked
into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom
we were speaking o f (LW1 108; PI p. 217).
On the one hand, he denies t h a t a n intention displays the
“criteria ofidentity” of a mental process, or at least of a “state
of consciousness.” For whereas the last has the “logical characteristic” of being interruptible by breaks in consciousness and
shifts in attention (RPP2 43-50), a n intention does not disappear when one momentarily attends to a n itch: a n intermitt e n t intention would not be one i n t e r r u p t e d by shifts i n
attention but would be “to have a n intention, to abandon it, to
resume it, and so on” (Z 47; cf., Z 46, 50). And while conscious
states have the related logical characteristic of having “genuine duration,” measurable by a stopwatch, with a beginning,
middle, and end (RPP2 51), intentions do not (Z 45). Importantly, Jill’s saying ”I meant my painting to portray Jack” does
make “essential reference” to a particular time (cf., RPPl 1757; RPP2 256, 266; PI p. 175). Yet, this report does not express
the memory of a n experience (RPP2 582; Z 44), but reflects, for
example, what she would have said at t h a t time where she
queried (PI 684; RPPl 1134-5). Yes, she might be able to recall
a n experience, but there could be no way of deriving what she
intended from this experience with any certainty (RPP2 576).
Wittgenstein, then, tentatively classifies as “mental dispositions” the motley of what are called “intentions,” although he
adds that unlike the disposition to jealousy a n intention is not
“a disposition in the true sense, inasmuch as one does not perceive such a disposition within himself as a matter of experience” (RPP2 178).
On the other hand, Wittgenstein argues that no process as
such can make a representation of a target. As he states in regard t o meaning a n utterance of him (LW1 818-21): “Meaning
[meinen] is not a process which accompanies words. For no
‘process’ could have t h e particular consequences of meaning
[meinen]” (LW1 820; PI p. 218). First, to state t h a t “Jill intends Jack” is without point or sense apart from the circumstance of her performing a particular act (cf., Z 12-28); but no
process Jill undergoes could have as its consequence, say, that
Jill portrays someone. Among other things, Jill’s behavior
could not count as such an act unless there were in place pructices of making pictures, of applying them of targets, or of using them t o represent how something is and of doing so by
virtue of how t h e picture a p p e a r s (cf., PI 205). Only t h e n
would Jill’s applying paint to a canvas have the significance of
painting a picture. More importantly, only when she is trained
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into these practices could her behavior have certain normative
consequences and count as the act of representing something
or of portraying someone; where her painting is supposed to
be of a particular person a n d is supposed to depict t h i s
person’s appearance, mood, or disposition; where the picture’s
observer is meant to become acquainted with this person’s appearance and so on; where her painting may be judged good
or bad, accurate or inaccurate, on a variety of criteria, including whether it captures his appearance, and so forth (cf., PI
692-3).
Second, Wittgenstein contends t h a t no process t h a t Jill
may undergo could have the consequence that her painting is
supposed to be of Jack. Here, I can only provide a summary of
his main reasons. Jill may, of course, focus her attention on
Jack while she paints his portrait. But her attending to Jack,
he claims, may consist in a variety of different processes and
there is no one characteristic process that occurs whenever
she does so (PI 35). Attending to Jack, besides, is a n intentional act, and a process-token counts as such a n act only because it is located i n a series of acts a n d because it has a
certain standing in a set of practices (PI 33). Furthermore, no
process in Jill’s head could so much as count as a ”sign” which
functions to designate something, he argues in his so-called
“private sensation language argument,” unless there were i n
place practices of designating objects together with their incumbent ramifications. Jack is a person, moreover, the particular person who is so-and-so. But Wittgenstein also argues
that such a being could neither satisfy nor fail to satisfy this
sign apart from a scaffolding of language-games wherein particulars and types of things are identified and discriminated,
or described a n d referred to ( P I 28-35, 257-261). Still, it
might be thought t h a t the mental mechanism tokening this
sign either represents or “realizes” in its structure a n “intension,” a rule determining this sign’s application. However, as
Wittgenstein stresses i n his remarks on following a rule, a
rule is no mere process but expresses what it is to proceed
correctly; it is something t h a t may be conformed to or uioluted. There could be no rule for the correct application of a
sign, moreover, unless there were a custom or regular use of
going on with this sign. Thus, whatever Jill might “represent”
in her mind, it could function as the representation of such a
rule, and function as a “signpost” guiding her correctly going
on, only within this practice (PI 197-202). Likewise, whatever
the mental mechanism tokening this sign might “realize” i n
its structure, if it could malfunction then the criterion for the
sign’s correct application could not be strictly with what its
tokening happens to “correspond.” The criterion for whether
something is the right sum of a n addition is not whether it is
the sum t h a t someone happens to produce; rather the crite-
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rion for whether someone correctly adds a sum is whether the
action performed conforms to the rule (cf., PG 56; PI 689-93).

Ix.
If i t i s not a “dead” process s h e undergoes, i t might be
tempting to conclude t h a t Jill’s intention is a “living” act she
performs from within diverse human and social practices, one
comprising the formation or use of a (mental) representation
whose t a r g e t is J a c k or which expresses t h a t J a c k is h e r
painting’s target.
Wittgenstein also denies t h a t the intention has the logical
characteristics of an act (PI 693). To intend a picture of him is
not the same as to think about him (PI 692; LW1 821). The
fundamental error, h e insists, is to think that t h e intention
“consists in” anything which could qualify as either “articulated” or “non-articulated” (Z 16; PI p. 217; contrast PR 6970). Naturally, Jill may imagine, think about, or speak of Jack,
before or during or after she paints his portrait (cf., RPPl
238). But such accompanying acts are on a par with her act of
creating Jack’s portrait, and they do not constitute her intention. After all, one cannot reliably infer t h a t Jill h a s performed any such act simply from the fact that she intends her
painting to portray Jack (Z 21). Nor is it correct to think t h a t
Jill intends her picture to portray Jack by means of one of a
family of more “basic” actions in the way that one can turn on
a light by flipping a switch or by pushing a button (Z 26). “It is
wrong to say: I meant him by looking at him. ‘Meaning’ does
not stand for a n activity which wholly or partly consists in the
‘utterances’ of meaning” (Z 19). For, unlike the command to
calculate a sum, the command to intend a painting to portray
so-and-so does not command one to do anything at all (Z 51).
I n order to obey the latter command, one must bring oneself
into this condition (Z 52), say by imagining a situation and a
history to fit this intention (Z 9).
Still, all this will be readily rebutted as long as one holds
that Jill’s intention must consist either in her mentally representing J a c k or i n h e r applying her picture conformably to
what this act sets out as her picture’s target. Wittgenstein’s
response is that this “must” produces a vicious regress (cf., BB
pp. 33-4). For what would make the mental representation of
Jack? If i t is not of Jack “inherently” then, according to this
“must,” its being meant of Jack has to consist in, say, her applying it conformably to what a second mental representation
lays out as its target, and so on. And Wittgenstein has maintained t h a t no mental act is any more “inherently” of J a c k
t h a n is a n act of painting a portrait. That is, he has argued
both that the target of a mental image is fixed neither by what
it resembles nor by its causal links, and that t h e target of a
306

Representation and Intention

sentence is not determined simply by the sense or reference of
its terms in a language but depends on the utterer’s intention-on her circumstances, beliefs, thoughts, and action^.'^
According to Wittgenstein, then, by itself no accompanying
representation has the consequence that another representation is of a certain target. If Jill is already painting Jack’s port r a i t then her painting is already of him, and a n
accompanying act of imagining or speaking of Jack does not
make her picture his portrait (RPP1 183; PI 683-4). It is instead a sign of which target she means her picture (LW1 818).
As Wittgenstein writes in regard t o meaning a sentence of
him:
Instead of ‘I meant him’ one may also say ‘I was speaking of
him.’ And how does one do that, how does one speak of him in
speaking those words? Why does i t sound wrong to say ‘I spoke
of him by pointing to him a s I spoke those words)?
‘To mean him’ means, say, ‘to talk of him.’ Not: to point to him.
And if I talk of him, of course there is a connexion between my
talk and him, but this connexion resides in the application of
the talk, not in the act of pointing. Pointing is itself only a
sign, and in the language-game it may direct the application of
the sentence, and so shew what is meant. (Z 24)

Now Jill may first imagine someone and then paint the person
she imagines (RPP2 82)) so that what she imagines “makes”
her painting of this person (LW1 311). But this is so because
she applies the painting she later creates of the person she
imagined earlier. She could apply it otherwise, and her so applying it does not itself consist in an act of representing anything. For suppose t h a t she also says t o herself t h a t she
intends t o paint a portrait of the person she has just imagined, namely Jack, and that she thereby forms the intention to
paint Jack’s portrait. Again, this makes the painting she produces into Jack’s portrait only if she later applies her painting
conformably t o the intention she formed by means of these
words. And, on pain of vicious regress, it had better not be the
case that her so applying her painting must require her to say,
in addition, that her painting is supposed t o be about just the
person that she has intended to portray.

X.
The question “What is Jill’s intention?” has turned out to be
misleading. It immediately inclines one to search out the intention in something occurring alongside her painting or act of
creating it. It is better t o ask this: What does one describe
when one describes Jill’s intention? Wittgenstein comments:
“Describing an intention means describing what went on from
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a particular point of view, with a particular purpose. I paint a
particular portrait of what went on” (Z 23). One might describe whom Jill meant her painting to portray in order to reveal something about her, or to render intelligible her further
behavior (PI 654-9). More directly, one’s purpose is to specify,
not what r a n through her mind, or what “caused” her painting
to be about Jack, but simply to which target she applies her
painting; and Wittgenstein compares the point of doing so to
the point of describing something’s function (PR 31; PG 95; Z
48). To say that a brake is meant to stop the car is to describe,
not what it does do (since it may malfunction) or can do (since
it may have all sorts of additional capacities), but its function
i n t h e system of the car, given the car’s uses. In turn, to describe the brake’s function is to state what it is supposed to do
so that, for example, one knows t h a t it malfunctions when it
does not stop the car. Similarly, to say what Jill’s painting is
meant to portray is to describe, not what i t does resemble or
what it could accurately represent, but which target it functions to be of in some system. And to describe this function is
to state what her painting is supposed to represent so that, for
example, one knows whom it portrays as looking a certain
way, or that it is inaccurate if it misrepresents this target.
But if what one describes when one describes Jill’s intention is what her painting functions to portray, then on what
basis does Jill’s painting function to portray Jack? Something
functions as a brake due to the role it plays in the system of a
car. But clearly, on Wittgenstein’s account, Jill’s painting cannot have this function due to the role a picture of its type of
appearance plays in a system of pictures. A better example, I
think, is the position of a needle on a car’s fuel gauge. Provided its role in the system of a car and the car’s use, a car’s
fuel gauge has the function of representing the level of fuel in
the gas tank. It is due to this function that the needle’s being
on ‘F” functions to represent that the gas tank is full. Given a
different function of t h i s gauge i n a different system, t h e
needle’s location on ‘F’ would function to represent something
else. This example, then, suggests t h a t Jill’s painting functions to portray Jack due to t h e function of that which employs this painting.
So what employs Jill’s painting? The answer, quite simply,
is a being who performs a particular act at some time and in
some context. Jill’s painting functions to be of Jack, t h a t is,
because what she does functions as the act of painting Jack’s
portrait. There is after all a “logical” link between Jill’s intention and what she does: it is true t h a t Jill means the picture
she paints to portray Jack if and only if it is true that Jill performs the act of painting Jack’s portrait. It is not that Jill’s intention is this act, or any other act accompanying it. Rather,
to describe Jill’s intention is to describe a particular sort of
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function of what she does. In this regard, Wittgenstein often
mentions diverse acts t h a t are of a person N and wherein one
makes or uses a gesture or image or picture or words: one
might command N to come by means of saying “Come here” or
by means of making a hand gesture, speak or talk of N, make
a remark with a n allusion to N, say that N is over there while
pointing, think about N, imagine N, write a letter to N, curse
N, or p a i n t N’s portrait (Z 21-32; PI 680-5). Here, as
Wittgenstein sees it, the gesture or image or picture or sentence is of N, not because this is their function in a system of
gestures and so forth, but because the act functions to be of N
(cf., LW1 318). When queried, therefore, one may answer “I
was speaking of N” in place of “I meant N” (Z 24; PI 687).If
one does say “I meant N,” one is describing not what one did,
or anything accompanying what one did, but a certain function
of what one did-what one’s act counted as being of-a function that other acts could have (cf., PI 680;Z 25).15
If this is so, then what makes a n act of forming or using
a representation count as being of a certain t a r g e t ?
Wittgenstein, unfortunately, provides only the germ of a n answer i n such comments as these: “What connects my words
with him? The situation and my thoughts. And my thoughts in
just the same way as the things I say out loud” (Z 9). “What
makes this sentence a sentence that has to do with him? The
fact t h a t we were speaking about him.-And what makes a
conversation a conversation about him?-Certain transitions
we make or would make” (LWI 318). Such remarks suggest
t h a t what makes Jill’s behavior count as the act of creating
Jack’s portrait is t h a t it is performed within a p a r t i c u l a r
stream of thoughts, acts, a n d events (provided her participation in a host of social and human practices). I t could be t h a t
Jack asked Jill to paint his portrait, Jill decided to accept his
commission and intended to paint his portrait, she used Jack
as her model, she corrected her painting so t h a t it better approximated his appearance or better captured his mood, and
later gave it to J a c k i n exchange for money (cf., BB p. 32).
Likewise, what makes a n image a n image of him is the particular “path on which it lies” (PG 99). An image may be of the
streets of one’s town because one may have formed this image
while attempting to figure out the best route from one’s house
to the grocery store. In general, therefore, Wittgenstein claims
t h a t what makes a representation of a target is the fact t h a t
its creation or use h a s a particular location i n a system of
transitions comprising the antecedent situation and history,
the present circumstances, and what follows (Z 7,9, 14, 26, 28;
BB p. 39; PG 99; RPPl230,240).
T h i s is why, if there is some question about w h a t Jill
means h e r painting t o portray, we m u s t ask her-and h e r
truthful answer would be decisive (LW1 813-8; PI p. 177). It is
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not that Jill’s answer is decisive because she can infallibly ascertain her intention whereas we can only guess. Indeed, were
she to t r y to do so, h e r judgment could be quite uncertain
since nothing in the surrounding circumstances might tie up
to h e r painting’s target unconditionally (Z 41; R P P l 230).
Rather, her answer may be decisive because it functions to establish a connection of her painting to Jack. Or, it may be decisive because she has performed t h e act of painting Jack’s
portrait and because she has done so in a particular situation
of which she is intimately aware. As Wittgenstein remarks in
regard to a related topic:
At the question ‘Why don’t I infer my probable actions from my
talk? one might say that it is like this: as an official in a ministry
I don’t infer the ministry’s probable decisions from the official utterances, since of course I am acquainted with the source, the genesis of these utterances and of the decisions .... (RPP 1 711)

XI.
Has Wittgenstein answered his question? Has he explained
what makes a picture or image or thought or sentence of him?
While h i s investigations do offer a perspicuous answer,
they may be seen as raising a number of issues, not all of
which Wittgenstein has himself pursued in any detail. In particular, there is the matter of just how a n act’s location in a
series of thoughts, acts, a n d circumstances is supposed to
make it count as the act of representing a certain target.
But even if he were to have taken his investigations furt h e r i n such a direction, he still would not have stated j u s t
which conditions a r e necessary a n d sufficient i n order for a
representation to be of a particular target. For Wittgenstein,
however, this is as should be. Exactitude is after all relative to
one’s aim, and Wittgenstein’s goal has been to provide a perspicuous overview of representation and intention in order to
untangle various philosophical snarls. Further, he doubts that
a more precise general explanation is to be had (RPP1 257) inasmuch as he denies that a picture may function to be of Jack
if and only if its formation or use occurs in the context of just
such-and-such thoughts and actions and circumstances (Z 26).
If this is so then the attempt at a “clearer” statement of the
necessary and sufficient conditions will likely be motivated by,
or produce, false “musts.” Wittgenstein freely allows, for example, t h a t Jill may have formed the prior intention to paint
Jack’s portrait. But we err, he believes, once we suppose t h a t
h e r act of painting Jack’s portrait must result from such a
prior intention; and in respect to this “must” he often stresses
that the link of picture to target might be forged only in what
follows (Z 7, 14,27).
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Nor does Wittgenstein forward a reductive explanation of
the intention. Not only does he make no pretense at “analyzing” Jill’s act of creating Jack’s portrait as just the “process”
with these or those causal inputs or outputs, everything indicates t h a t h e would t r e a t such a n “analysis” as hopelessly
wrongheaded. Clearly, moreover, he assumes t h a t Jill’s creation of a picture is the act of painting Jack’s portrait just because it belongs to a particular series of thoughts a n d acts
that are themselves about diverse targets. “The connection between the portrait of N and N himself,” Wittgenstein observes,
could (but need not! (PG 99)) reside in the fact “that the name
written underneath is the name used to address him” (PG 62).
But the act of tacking a name onto a picture can either make
it the portrait of N or report that it is N s portrait only if there
is already a link in place between this sign and N, and only if
this name has the appropriate application in this situation. Finally, he has argued that Jill’s act of painting a picture (or her
surrounding thoughts and acts) could not count as being of
Jack, or as representing what he is like, a p a r t from a rich
scaffolding of human and social practices together with t h e
form of life in which they inhere.
J e r r y Fodor writes: “It’s hard to see ... how one can be a
Realist about intentionality without being, to some extent or
other, a Reductionist .... If aboutness is real, it must really be
something else.”I6 Disregarding the misreading of Wittgenstein
as a behaviorist, what may give rise to the suspicion t h a t he
denies the “reality” of the intention is precisely that he has no
i n t e r e s t i n reducing it t o something presumed, on some a
priori basis, to be “more real”-whether a mental or physical
process, or a relation of resemblance or causation. This reflects
Wittgenstein’s general (though rather nuanced) forswearing of
“explanation” in favor of “describing the phenomena.” But, in
t h e case of intentionality, t h i s bespeaks something else as
well:
An explanation of the operation of language as a psychophysical
mechanism is of no interest to us. Such an explanation itself
uses language to describe phenomena (association, memory etc);
it is itself a linguistic act and stands outside the calculus; but
we need an explanation which is part of the calculus. (PG 33)

A reductionist’s explanation of the intention is itself a n intentional act employing language meant of a target. The reductionist is t h u s i n danger of defeating herself when t h e
consequence of her explanation is to obscure the significance
and normative standing of her act. She is also in danger of exchanging the living explanadurn of intentionality for a dead
phenomenon. Wittgenstein observes t h a t when viewed from
the “outside,” i n “isolation” from its surroundings, a picture
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appears “dead”: “It does not point outside itself to a reality beyond” (PG 100).Yet, if t h e actions and context surrounding
someone’s creation or use of a picture or image are also viewed
from the outside, as “processes” of diverse causal relations, as
under t h e reductionist’s gaze, t h e n they too appear as dead
(PG 100).A living explanation of intentionality, h e believes,
can only hope to elucidate it from within rather than pretend
to explain it from without.

NOTES
l
The following are Ludwig Wittgenstein’s texts that I will refer to
by abbreviation. All numbers refer to remark number unless preceded
by a ‘p’ for a Dage reference.
BB
The BlEe and Brown Books (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956).
LW1 Last Writings, Volume I, Preliminary Studies for Part 11 of Philosophical Investigations, G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, eds.,
C. J. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, trans. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982).
PG
Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees, ed., A. Kenny, trans. (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1974).
PI
Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edition, G. E. M. Anscombe and
R. Rhees, eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1953).
PR
Philosophical Remarks, R. Rhees, ed., R. Hargreaves and R.
White, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975).
RPPl Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume I, G . E. M.
Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds., G. E. M. Anscombe, trans.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
RPPB Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 11, G. H. von
Wright and H. Nyman, eds., C. G. Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue,
trans. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
TLP Ductatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. F. Pears, trans. (London:
McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961).
Zettel, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, eds., G. E. M.
Z
Anscombe. trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1967).
For other discussions of Wittgenstein’s views on this topic see, for
example, P. M. S. Hacker, “The Agreement of Thought and Reality,” in
Wittgenstein’s Intentions, J. Canfield and S. Shanker, eds. (New York
and London: Garland Publishing, 1993), 38-50; and Malcolm Budd,
Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology (London and New York:
Routledge, 1989), 125-145.
This is not to say that there are no important differences between
mental images and physical pictures or that Wittgenstein does not resist identifying the two. In RPPB 63 he states: “Images are not pictures.
I do not tell what object I am imagining by the resemblance between it
and the image.” It is hard to tell whether the second sentence is meant
as the reason for the first. I t would be a bad one since he also denies
that one ascertains what a picture one makes is about by what it resembles (RPP2 115; cf. PG 62; BB p. 32). A better reason would be that
mental images are not enduring objects t h a t are repeatedly viewable
and from multiple perspectives by a homunculus (cf., RPP2 63-144).
Even so, Wittgenstein draws a parallel between imagining something on
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will and creating a picture of something (RPP2 1151, and between having a n image pop into one’s head and seeing a picture (PI p. 177; LW1
316). He also assumes that a n image, like a picture, may be of him,
represent that he looks a certain way, and indeed “look like” him. One
may reveal the look of an image that pops into one’s head by means of a
picture, even though one may not know what this image is about or
from what it is derived (RPP2 63; LW1 316).
In BB p. 37, while attempting to dispel t h e notion t h a t a
proposition’s sense is a “shadow” or “picture” alongside the proposition,
Wittgenstein further marks off “copies” or “pictures by similarity” from
other pictures. “Copies are good pictures when they can be easily mistaken for what they represent.” In contrast, an accurate plane projection
of one hemisphere of the terrestrial globe is not a “copy” insofar a s it
does not look like its target.
This use of the term “target” is largely indebted to Robert
Cummins, Representations, Targets, and Attitude, (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1996). Wittgenstein, of course, does not use the terms “target” or “content” in these ways, and while he certainly speaks of what a
picture
we shall see that his views on what a picture can show
alter over time. Nonetheless, I believe that this schema will be of considerable aid in understanding his conception of the logic of pictorial
representation.
I should say why I choose to use the term “content” rather than
“sense” to refer to what a representation represents a target as being.
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein speaks of a picture’s or proposition’s
“sense” (Sinn), and his views there allow little discrimination between a
picture’s or proposition’s sense and what I call its content. Matters are
rather different in his later philosophy. Here, he very rarely speaks of a
picture’s “sense” and, as we shall see, he ties talk of a “proposition’s
sense” to what a type of proposition means in the language rather than
to what someone is, say, asserting by means of this proposition in some
particular context and time.
I should also mention that my distinction between a picture’s “target”
and what it “shows”is similar to Nelson Goodman’s distinction between
“a picture of a black horse” and “a black-horse picture” (see Languages
ofArt [Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 19681), while my distinction of “target” and “content” is not unlike Fred Dretske’s distinction
between a picture’s “topic” and its “comment” (see Explaining Behavior
[Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19881, 70-1). However, Goodman speaks
of what a picture is of as its “denotation,” and Dretske speaks of a
picture’s “topic” a s its “reference.” I find this rather misleading, especially when a similar distinction is drawn in regard to linguistic utterances. For, as I shall later suggest, to speak of a linguistic utterance’s
target is not the same to speak of the “reference” of a sign in the languy!.
For discussions of the Ductatus’ views on especially how the correlation of a proposition’s names to simple objects is made see the following: Steve Gerrard, “Two Ways of Grounding Meaning,” Philosophical
Investigations 14 ( 2 ) 1991: 95-114; Richard McDonough, “The Philosophical Psychologism of the Tractatus,” Southern Journal of Philosophy
31 (4) 1993: 425-447.
These methods of division are tied to our interests, needs, and
aims. But that does not mean, as Wittgenstein observes in RPP145-49
and PI p. 230, that “general facts of nature” may not make one method

313

Mark E. Weber
of dividing things up, relative to our interests, needs, and aims, appear
“natural” (but not “necessary”). And though it would not follow that we
would employ different methods of division were these general facts
other than what they are, or that our current methods would become incoherent, our current methods could become useless.
As I am reading his “remarks on following a rule” in PI 138-242
and elsewhere, therefore, Wittgenstein’s goal is not to raise “skeptical
doubts” concerning the possibility of rules (although, a s he admits, his
remarks may have this appearance), but is to dispel a mistaken view of
their nature and ground as well as provide a perspicuous representation
of both. See, in contrast, Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
Oddly, the Dactatus granted that the same schematic drawing of
a cube may be a t once isomorphic to two different possible situations in
reality-to a cube with this face in the fore, and to a cube with that face
in the fore (TLP 5.5423). Yet, i t did not proceed to ask: “So which of
these does it represent a s being the case in reality?”
lo According to Wittgenstein in PR pp. 301-3, and again in PG pp.
199-201 (see also BB p. 31), a house is a “complex”whereas “that I am
tired” is a ”fact.” Complexes may move, facts do not. Complexes are
spatial objects, facts are not. Complexes, but not facts, can be literally
pointed at. Complexes are wholes composed of parts, facts are not. And
while it is a fact that a complex is composed of such-and-such parts arranged in such-and-such ways, a complex is not composed of its parts
and their relations. However, it is unclear both whether Wittgenstein
takes all this to contradict the Ductatus, and whether the Tractatus
does confuse facts and complexes (see, for example, Anthony Kenny,
“The Ghost of the Tractatus,” in Understanding Wittgenstein, G. Vesey,
ed. [Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 19741, 1-13). It strikes that
me that the Ductatus does assume a distinction between fact and complex when, for instance, it construes a fact (Tatsache), not as a state of
affairs (Sachverhalt) tout court, but as the existence (or nonexistence) of
a state of affairs (2). It also strikes me that the Dactatus implicitly acknowledges the point I am making in this paragraph when it writes “A
proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand if it
is true” and adds that it “says that they do so stand” (4.022). If this is
the case, then the Dactatus may be said to allow a distinction between
what a picture “shows,” a possible state of affairs, and its “content,”
which fact (or facts) it represents as being the case in reality.
l1 Of course, in order for there to be pictorial misrepresentation i t
had better not be the case t h a t one is constrained to so interpret a
picture’s content t h a t i t t u r n s out to represent its target correctly.
While I do not believe that one is so constrained on Wittgenstein’s account, I will not try to pursue this complex issue here.
l2 In this respect, Wittgenstein often dwells on phenomena t h a t
heighten the potential dissonance between a word’s meaning
(Bedeutung) in the language and what a speaker means (meinen) by it,
as for instance when one makes a special code language from everyday
words, or when one plays the game of meaning a word such as “bank”
with now this meaning, now with that. Similarly, he explores the import of someone’s being incapable of saying with which meaning she
means a word in some context, or of playing the game of meaning a
word with now this meaning, now that, outside any particular context
(cf., RPPl 175-250, passim; PI pp. 214-216).
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Is I need stress that the “Causal Thesis” at issue here concerns what
fixes a representation’s target and thus differs in aim from the various,
currently popular, “causal theories of meaning.” In general, the latter
largely seek to explain the ground of the semantics of the predicate expressions of a “language of thought”-how tokens of a predicate-type
“mean” the instantiations of a certain property, irrespective of the time
or context of their tokening. Jerry Fodor, in A Theory of Content and
Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19901, for example, proposes t h a t tokens of the language of thought symbol “dog” denote dog
instantiations because there is a nomic causal covariance between dogs
and the property that causes a cognitive system to token “dog“ when it
is about the business of detecting what is present in its sensory environment, where any non-dog-to-“dog“causal link would be “asymmetrically
dependent” on the dog-to-”dog“ causal link. Such a theory is inherently
ill-suited as a n account of a representation’s target if, as Wittgenstein
supposes, different tokens of the same representation-type may have
different targets in different times and contexts.
l4 Thus, even if a person were to possess a n innately understood
“language of thought” whose terms have “inherent meaning,” as some
are want to speculate (see Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 19751), it would not follow that any
sentence-token in this language is inherently of a target.
Like Wittgenstein, Robert Cummins (see, Representations, Targets,
and Attitudes [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 19961)holds that a representation-token functions to be of a target in virtue of what tokens it.
However, Cummins discussion of representations and their targets occurs in the context of contemporary cognitive science, and in this context his view is roughly that what makes t the target of a token of a
mental representation r is that r is tokened by a cognitive mechanism
or system whose functional role in the mental economy is to represent t .
l6 Jerry Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 97.
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